Part 1 highlighted the early history of wildland fires in the National Park Service (NPS), from an era of suppression to science-based fire management. Check out the previous post if you missed it. But that account wasn’t the end of the story.
The evolution of NPS wildland fire management was a steady process of decades-long science interspersed with some political intrusion. In 1978, innovations from the 1976 Task Directive review were codified into the National Park Service Fire Policy (NPS-18) and applied to most individual park area fire plans up through the mid-1980s. As the decade drew to a close, the NPS had a structure and process for managing fire, albeit one that had yet to be seriously tested.
That test came in the summer of 1988. In the first sixteen years of Yellowstone's natural fire policy (1972-1987), 235 fires were allowed to burn (only burning 33,759 acres) and only 15 fires were larger than 100 acres. All extinguished naturally. Public response was good, and the program considered a success.
Then in July, extreme weather took control. Major fires broke out. Because of ultra-dry conditions, the decision was made to suppress all fires in the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem. Within only a week, fires inside the park encompassed nearly 99,000 acres, and by the end of the month, dry built-up fuels and high winds combined to make the larger fires nearly uncontrollable.
By October, 248 fires had started in greater Yellowstone. Seven major fires were responsible for more than 95% of the 1.2 million acres burned. NPS fire management once again turned into a national political hot potato.
What could have been a substantial challenge to NPS fire policy and objectives, turned out to be unassertive. In 1990 the General Accounting Office issued its investigative report Federal Fire Management. It found benefits of allowing some fires to burn in controlled situations, progress on a revamped prescribed fire program, and the need to monitor the program implementation. But again, one element not mentioned directly – global warming.
As the 1990s ended, the NPS again redefined its policies and instituted greater safeguards. But now it faced a century-old problem: much of the land in its care and even more acreage surrounding national parks had been subjected to suppression for a long time. Very little of those forests had been treated to reduce the primary consequences of suppression: a buildup of heavy fuel load.
That one missing element – global climate change – was now beginning to make world headlines and the NPS wisely anticipated destructive fires on its lands.
As the twenty-first century dawned, the NPS saw fires that were indeed not following the rules: Cerro Grande at Bandelier; Outlet Fire at Grand Canyon; Complex Fire in Sequoia/Kings Canyon; East Troublesome Fire in Rocky Mt.; Mustang Fire in Everglades; Rim Fire in Yosemite; Carr Fire in Whiskeytown; much of Alaska – and many others on Forest Service and BLM lands.
Once again, these fires led to questions. Political interests asked about the efficacy and concerns on NPS’s fire management strategy but not on climate change. Suppression as the sole strategy was gone; the intentional use of fire had been developed, challenged, and then improved by the experiences of a generation of application. Fire had a firm role in the NPS but the evolution of management in response to demographic change, politics, and statute remained uncertain.
Prescription fire continued as an important tool but the boundaries on its use remained in flux. Questions for the NPS: how to integrate fire management goals with the controversy of prescribed burns and those naturally occurring fires that were allowed to burn and, a new serious uncertainty - how does a warming climate affect all of the fire science learned during the past 60 years?
Enter the Grand Canyon North Rim (Dragon Bravo) Fire of 2025. A July 4th lightning strike fire was initially managed as a “confine and contain” fire in order to fulfill its natural role in the ecosystem. A week later as the fire exploded in size due to hot, dry, and extremely windy conditions, the strategy shifted to aggressive suppression. By September 29 the fire was listed as 100% contained after burning 145,504 acres and destroying 82 structures including the historic Grand Canyon Lodge. Political scrutiny became as hot as the fire itself.
Another look into fire management will probably take some time while internally, the NPS is already gathering its critical data. The Grand Canyon Trust, a group that advocates on issues in and around the park, provided the following: “When fires are managed successfully, we almost never hear about it. I’ve seen fire managers at Grand Canyon and elsewhere manage beneficial fires skillfully and successfully many, many times. We owe them a debt of gratitude for that work. [Still] There should be an apolitical, independent assessment of the fire so that everyone can better understand the circumstances of the fire and how we could work to avoid the kind of losses we’ve already seen in the future,”
So, what does the Administration propose for 2026?
Consolidating the NPS wildland fire program into a new U.S. Wildland Fire Service which may shift research, philosophy, and decision-making to a consortium of Federal land agencies. The budget portends a huge increase in monies for full suppression activities, but a $1.2 billion cut to NPS Operations. Additional fire scientists may be culled along with administration personnel who support frontline firefighters. Expect on-again-off-again grants for wildland fire management. Don’t even mention global climate change. The budget also proposes transferring some national park areas to states along with fire responsibilities.
As long as there are national parks, wildland fire management will remain an issue with this administration. Devaluing personnel in the field and science in the office continues. Uncertainty abounds. It is one constant in varied landscapes. And now, we will see how (or if) climate change will enter into the equation. Stay tuned!
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